Eni S.p.A.

Sector: oil-gas

Estimated missed savings vs. renewable-transition baseline · 2022–2026

Eni S.p.A. could have saved $3.2B.

Here's the receipt.

We modelled what Eni would have saved if it had undertaken a sustainability transformation before the crises — diversifying from Russian pipeline dependency into renewable self-supply, locking in PPAs across 35 TWh of internal consumption, and building resilient energy sourcing beyond Hormuz-exposed LNG. The net figure captures transformation savings from avoided Russian gas scramble, hedged energy procurement, and diversified LNG sourcing, minus transition capex. Plenitude is a start, but a full transformation would have been insurance that paid for itself. All figures are annualised pre-tax estimates.

THE PRICE OF ACTING

Remediation cost
$1.4B
Net saving if acted
$1.8B net if acted
“Less than Eni's $1.9B 2024 executive bonuses and long-term incentive plans. They chose payouts over prudence.”

Based on 1-2% capex investment in efficiency measures per IEA 2024 benchmarks.

View line-by-line breakdown (4 items)

Line items

  • Supply chain diversification would have avoided the Russian gas scramble: renewable PPAs vs 23x TTF spike

    Saving$3.2B
    Sources:
    Assumptions:
    • Russian gas supply loss and emergency LNG procurement
      3200 USD million

      Scope: Line items 1

      Eni sourced ~20 bcm/yr from Russia via long-term pipeline contracts. When flows were cut in 2022, replacement LNG cost TTF spot prices peaking at 350 EUR/MWh vs pre-crisis 15 EUR/MWh. Excess procurement cost estimated at $3.2B annualised over 2022-2023.

      [1]
    Medium — Diversifying from 20 bcm/yr Russian dependency into renewables and diversified LNG would have saved $3.2B: 20 bcm at pre-crisis $15/MWh vs emergency spot at $350/MWh over 2022-2023. Renewable self-supply eliminates single-supplier pipeline risk entirely.

  • Renewable PPAs would have hedged 35 TWh of internal consumption against the 2022 TTF energy crisis

    Saving$2.1B
    Sources:
    Assumptions:
    • Renewable PPA vs crisis-era fossil generation spread
      60 USD/MWh

      Scope: Line items 2

      2020-vintage solar/wind PPAs in Southern Europe locked in at ~$35/MWh (IRENA 2024). Crisis-era gas-fired generation cost ~$95/MWh using 2022 TTF prices. Spread of $60/MWh is conservative.

      [5]
    • Eni internal electricity consumption
      35 TWh/yr

      Scope: Line items 2

      Estimated from industry benchmarks for Eni's combined upstream, refining, and petrochemical operations at its production scale.

      Internal estimate: Eni does not separately disclose total internal electricity consumption. Estimate derived from IEA energy intensity benchmarks for integrated oil majors at Eni's production scale.

    Medium — A 2020-vintage PPA at $35/MWh would have saved $60/MWh vs crisis-era $95/MWh generation: 35 TWh x $60/MWh = $2.1B. Conservative — actual TTF-linked costs peaked far higher, making the renewable hedge even more valuable.

  • Diversified energy sourcing would have avoided Hormuz LNG disruption from QatarEnergy force majeure

    Saving$1.4B
    Sources:
    Assumptions:
    • Hormuz LNG supply disruption from QatarEnergy force majeure
      1400 USD million

      Scope: Line items 3

      QatarEnergy declared force majeure on LNG cargoes during the Feb-Mar 2026 Hormuz closure. Eni holds long-term Qatari LNG offtake. Lost contracted volumes and replacement spot procurement estimated at $1.4B.

      [4]
    Medium — Renewable self-supply and diversified LNG sourcing would have avoided $1.4B: QatarEnergy declared force majeure during Hormuz closure, leaving Eni's contracted cargoes stranded. Replacement procurement at crisis spot vs hedged renewable supply = $1.4B gap.

  • Transition capex: renewable self-supply buildout for 35 TWh

    Cost$3.5B
    Sources:
    Assumptions:
    • Renewable self-supply capex (annualised)
      3500 USD million/yr

      Scope: Line items 4

      Building 35 TWh/yr of solar capacity in Southern Europe/North Africa at ~$0.7M/MW installed, ~22% capacity factor, requires ~18 GW. At $700/kW amortised over 25 years plus O&M, annualised cost ~$3.5B.

      [5]
    Medium

$3.2B

Medium

Bleeding

Foolishness score62

Show derivation
  1. 2022 Russian gas supply loss: Libyan/Algerian/Russian dependencyValue: 0.85Weight: 0.25[1]
  2. Emergency LNG procurement at peak TTF pricesValue: 0.75Weight: 0.25[6]
  3. Hormuz LNG exposure (QatarEnergy force majeure)Value: 0.6Weight: 0.2[4]
  4. Plenitude renewables offset (partial credit)Value: 0.3Weight: 0.15[2]
  5. Continued upstream expansion in 40 countriesValue: 0.55Weight: 0.15[3]

Formula: Weighted sum of crisis-exposure factors: catastrophic loss of Russian gas supply in 2022, emergency LNG procurement at TTF peaks (15→350 EUR/MWh), Hormuz exposure through QatarEnergy LNG contracts, partial offset for Plenitude renewables division, and continued upstream expansion despite crisis lessons. Higher = more foolish.

Weights version: v1.0

Deep dive: assumptions, methodology & revision history

Assumptions

  • Russian gas supply loss and emergency LNG procurement
    3200 USD million

    Scope: Line items 1

    Eni sourced ~20 bcm/yr from Russia via long-term pipeline contracts. When flows were cut in 2022, replacement LNG cost TTF spot prices peaking at 350 EUR/MWh vs pre-crisis 15 EUR/MWh. Excess procurement cost estimated at $3.2B annualised over 2022-2023.

    [1]
  • Renewable PPA vs crisis-era fossil generation spread
    60 USD/MWh

    Scope: Line items 2

    2020-vintage solar/wind PPAs in Southern Europe locked in at ~$35/MWh (IRENA 2024). Crisis-era gas-fired generation cost ~$95/MWh using 2022 TTF prices. Spread of $60/MWh is conservative.

    [5]
  • Eni internal electricity consumption
    35 TWh/yr

    Scope: Line items 2

    Estimated from industry benchmarks for Eni's combined upstream, refining, and petrochemical operations at its production scale.

    Internal estimate: Eni does not separately disclose total internal electricity consumption. Estimate derived from IEA energy intensity benchmarks for integrated oil majors at Eni's production scale.

  • Hormuz LNG supply disruption from QatarEnergy force majeure
    1400 USD million

    Scope: Line items 3

    QatarEnergy declared force majeure on LNG cargoes during the Feb-Mar 2026 Hormuz closure. Eni holds long-term Qatari LNG offtake. Lost contracted volumes and replacement spot procurement estimated at $1.4B.

    [4]
  • Renewable self-supply capex (annualised)
    3500 USD million/yr

    Scope: Line items 4

    Building 35 TWh/yr of solar capacity in Southern Europe/North Africa at ~$0.7M/MW installed, ~22% capacity factor, requires ~18 GW. At $700/kW amortised over 25 years plus O&M, annualised cost ~$3.5B.

    [5]

Annual revenue

$94.7B

[1]

Methodology

We modelled what Eni would have saved if it had undertaken a sustainability transformation before the crises — diversifying from Russian pipeline dependency into renewable self-supply, locking in PPAs across 35 TWh of internal consumption, and building resilient energy sourcing beyond Hormuz-exposed LNG. The net figure captures transformation savings from avoided Russian gas scramble, hedged energy procurement, and diversified LNG sourcing, minus transition capex. Plenitude is a start, but a full transformation would have been insurance that paid for itself. All figures are annualised pre-tax estimates.

Revision history

  1. 1av

    Initial publication with researched data from Eni FY2025 results, Eni for 2024 sustainability report, Reclaim Finance assessment, Carbon Tracker analysis, and IEA WEO 2024.

  2. 2av

    Reframed receipt around 2022 Russian gas crisis and 2026 Hormuz disruption. Replaced generic carbon pricing line items with crisis-specific Russian gas loss, TTF procurement spikes, and QatarEnergy force majeure. Emphasised Italian gas dependency.

    • net_missed_savings.amount30000000003200000000
  3. 3av

    Reframed line item labels, methodology note, confidence notes, and roast from damage framing to transformation-opportunity framing. Amounts, scores, citations, and assumptions unchanged.

Edited by: av

Last reviewed:

Sources

  1. Eni Full Year 2025 Results — Eni S.p.A. (accessed 12 Apr 2026)
  2. Eni for 2024 Sustainability Report — Eni S.p.A. (accessed 12 Apr 2026)
  3. Assessment of Eni's Climate Strategy (April 2025) — Reclaim Finance (accessed 12 Apr 2026)
  4. EIA: Hormuz closure and related production outages (April 2026) — U.S. Energy Information Administration (accessed 12 Apr 2026)
  5. Renewable Power Generation Costs in 2024 — International Renewable Energy Agency (accessed 12 Apr 2026)
  6. World Energy Outlook 2024 — International Energy Agency (accessed 12 Apr 2026)